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ABSTRACT
This diploma thesis examines new markets in telecommunications industry 
and how regulatory authorities and public entities should or could act in 
order to foster broadband deployment. I present the importance of a fast 
development of new generation networks for an economy and provide and 
analyse an exemplary model  of  how regulation authorities  could treat  a 
potential new market. For this purpose, I have a look on dynamic efficiency 
and  how  the  concepts  of  Schumpeter  could  help  to  find  an  optimal 
regulation strategy.
Furthermore I present the situation in Austria, whereas I conclude, that the 
deployment of new generation networks has not yet reached a satisfactory 
state. Thus, I try to analyse recent regulation policies and bring up some 
other ideas, which could help fostering broadband deployment. Regulatory 
holidays,  open access  policy  or  concerted public  subsidies  could help to 
reach  the  goal  of  a  comprehensive  coverage  of  modern  high-speed 
broadband networks.
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Part I. Introduction into the topic
 1 Introduction  
1.1 Motivation for this work  
There were hardly any events which had such a giant influence on economy 
and society as the revolutions in the telecommunications industry within 
the last decades. Since the mid 1980ies mobile phones and internet are on a 
way  of  completely  changing  people's  communication  habits.  And  the 
development of new technologies is still in progress. 
From an economic point  of  view,  it  is  interesting,  which influences  new 
technologies as the Internet or mobile phones have on growth, employment 
and  education.  Furthermore  it  is  even  more  interesting,  how  future 
technologies  in  the  telecommunications  sector  will  influence  our  lives. 
Innovation  and  investment  in  new,  faster  broadband  networks  or  faster 
mobile internet or whatever will appear in the upcoming years, will have a 
direct influence on a country's competitiveness.  
In former times,  the telecommunications industry in Europe was usually 
controlled by firms owned and controlled by governments. Britain was the 
first European country to liberalise the telecommunications sector. Since the 
end of the 1990ies the whole European Union follows this way, whereas 
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some of the markets are left to free competition, while others are regulated 
by National Regulation Agencies (NRAs). Thus, perfect regulation strategies 
to establish an investment-friendly, efficient industry were recently in the 
centre of economic interest. 
While the EU-framework for new markets is the same all over Europe, not 
every country has reached the same state of broadband deployment by now. 
Concerning  so-called  new  generation  networks  (NGN),  which  provide 
broadband access with speed of 100Mbit/s or higher, especially Austria still 
has  a  lot  of  work  to  do,  if  the  country  did  not  want  to  lose  its 
competitiveness. Thus, regulation strategies as well as public policy has to 
be analysed and adjusted to find a way of how to foster investment into this 
area. 
1.2 Goal of this work  
The goal of the first part of this paper is to review the current regulation 
strategies  for  new  and  emerging  markets  in  Europe.  Furthermore 
comprising  economic  theory  about  dynamic  competition  should  give  us 
hints  to  get  an  idea  about  how  fast-changing  markets  as  in 
telecommunications  industry  respond  to  different  regulation  policies. 
Finally, different ways of how to react to quick developments in dynamic 
markets as the telecommunications industry are discussed.
The second part should analyse the Austrian telecommunications market. 
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The aim is to find problems, why Austria is  far behind when looking at 
dispersion of  new generation networks  and,  moreover,  find and  model 
possible solutions. Therefore recent regulation strategies are analysed and 
some possible policy implications are provided.
1.3 Overview  
After this overview, I will underline the relevance of this paper's issue by 
presenting  some  economic  impacts  of  new  technologies  in  the 
telecommunications sector. I will consider some recent studies, which are 
made  about  telecommunications  markets  and  their  influence  on  the 
economy.
Part I is about the theoretical and legal background of the issue. Therefore, 
in Chapter 3, I will explain the active regulation policies of the European 
Union.  I  will  talk  about  the  liberalisation  process  and  the  Commission 
Guidelines  from 2002.  Chapter  4  treats  the  definition  of  markets.  I  will 
explain the SSNIP-test and outline its characteristics when defining new and 
emerging markets. Chapter 5 deals with regulation strategies for new and 
emerging markets. I will give insights into dynamic theory to understand 
the  essential  difference  between  static  and  dynamic  efficiency,  which  is 
important for fast-developing markets as the telecommunications industry. I 
will then talk about regulatory holidays and possible treatment of pioneer 
monopolies and its impact on investment and innovation. 
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In part II I will analyse the Austrian telecommunications market. In Chapter 
7 I  will  present the structure of the Austrian telecommunications market 
and outline some of the major problems that could be a reason for the slow 
deployment of NGNs. Furthermore I will provide some recently proposed 
regulatory measures and analyse their impacts on broadband investment. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I will try to provide some strategies of how the country 
could foster broadband development in the future.
2 Economic impacts of investment into new   
telecommunications technologies
2.1 Recent developments in telecommunications industry  
Over  the  last  decades,  telecommunication  markets  recorded  significant 
technological  change.  Completely  new  technologies  like  the  Internet  or 
mobile phones offered a wide range of new services and products, which 
influenced or even revolutionized the whole economy. In the last years, this 
development seemed to be even more drastic and it is hard to say, when this 
revolutionary process will slow down. 
Especially the Internet was and still  is a source for a wide range of new 
application areas. Voice over IP (VoIP), TV over IP or online games are just a 
few examples of services that will gain popularity within the next years. “All 
these hyper-connectivity services for business and private use are stoking 
the thirst for bandwidth” formulates Stefan Heng the future development in 
12
his article “Broadband infrastructure” for the Deutsche Bank1. 
In 1998, Jakob Nielsen predicted for the UK raising Internet access speed by 
averagely 50% every year. As Fig. 1 shows, this prediction seems to be true. 
From an economic point of view, it is interesting, what kinds of effects the 
fast  development  of  telecommunications  technology has  on  an  economy 
and if it is possible and useful for an economy to actuate this evolution even 
further. 
Fig.  1:  Nielsen predicted a  growth of  Internet  access speed by 50% p.a.2 
(Source: Broadband infrastructure, Deutsche Bank Research, May 2010)
1 Stefan Heng in “Broadband infrastructure”, Deutsche Bank Research, May 2010, p.3
2 Deutsche Bank Research (2010), “Broadband infrastructure” in Economics 77, p. 3.
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2.2 Economic returns of investment into broadband   
deployment
A  sufficient  coverage  of  broadband  networks  means  quick  access  to 
information  for  companies,  educational  or  research  facilities  and  simply 
men  in  the  street.  Nowadays  it  is  probably  one  of  the  most  important 
drivers for further development in Europe and other developed countries, 
but  also  a  big  chance  for  developing  countries.  It  not  only  enables 
engagement in modern technologies industries (i.e. service providers on the 
internet like internet providers, hosts, shops, etc.) but also helps companies 
to make their production processes more efficient. Investment into modern 
technologies can trigger structural changes in economies, for example “by 
raising product market competition in many sectors, especially in services”3.
On the other hand, one has to invest into broadband networks to ensure its  
availability in a whole country. Katz et al.  (2009) calculated the need for 
investment  in  the  upcoming  years  in  Germany  to  fulfil  the  German 
government's aims for broadband deployment. They found out that it will 
be necessary to totally invest 20.243 million Euro until 20144.
While  investing  into  telecommunications  infrastructure  was  mainly 
governments'  business  in  most  countries  in  Europe  till  the  end  of  the 
1990ies,  due  to  liberalization  it  is  nowadays  business  of  –  more  or  less 
private  –  companies,  whose  main  aim is  to  maximize  their  profits.  The 
effects of regulation on these investments are discussed later in this paper. 
3 OECD (2007), Broadband and the Economy, p. 5
4 cf. Katz et al. (2009), p. 13
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For now, I do not want to examine the question of who invests and why this 
specific investor does, but of the general importance of investment in the 
broadband sector and the economic returns for the whole society.
The OECD-study “Broadband and the Economy” points  out that  “ICTs5, 
including  computers  and  the  Internet,  are  generally  considered  to  be  a 
GPT”6,  a general purpose technology. GPTs are main technologies, which 
have an extraordinary effect on the economy. Other examples for GPTs were 
electricity or the steam machine. They can not only heighten an economy's 
GDP  as  maybe  other  new  technologies  might  be  able  to,  but  start  a 
revolution in the production processes of an economy. 
In  the  case  of  the  Internet,  it  is  especially  the  fast  transmission  of 
information, which forces development. As any other technology, GPTs are 
being  enhanced  after  their  detection.  Looking  at  the  Internet,  these 
advancements  might  be  new  transmission  protocols,  programming 
languages  or  services.  Since  most  more  recent  types  of  Internet-use  like 
video transmission, VoIP and so on need high transfer rates, deployment of 
broadband is probably the most important enhancement in this sector. The 
OECD-report compares it  to electricity supply. Without a well-developed 
grid no one could use the fabulous invention of electrical power7. 
Crandall et al. (2007) made one of the first empirical studies concerning this 
issue. They looked at “The effects of broadband deployment on output and 
5 Abbr.: Information and Communication Technologies
6 OECD (2007), Broadband and the Economy, p. 8
7 cf. OECD (2007), Broadband and the Economy, p. 9
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employment“ and show, that there is indeed a positive effect of availability 
of broadband on the growth of employment and GDP. They also state, that 
“broadband benefits accumulate over time”8  and that service sectors benefit 
most9. According  to  OECD  estimates,  broadband  communication  will 
contribute  one-third  to  the  productivity  growth  of  highly  developed 
countries by 2011. 10 
We can find two main types of  effects  how the extension of  broadband-
networks  could  affect  a  country's  economy.  One  type  occurs  from  the 
instalment process itself, those are the direct effects, the other one from the 
long-term  returns  of  broadband  technology,  which  we  will  call  indirect 
effects. 
There  is  a  high  demand  for  workers  (e.g.  telecommunication  engineers, 
building  labour)  during  the  construction  process,  which  can  reduce 
unemployment and increase GDP in the short run. The higher households' 
income induces higher spending and thus higher growth in other economic 
sectors. Firms that are linked to the construction companies (e.g. accounting 
companies,  etc.)  profit  indirectly  from  the  investments  in  broadband  – 
networks. 
Katz et al. (2009) tried to measure these effects for the German economy by 
using Input/Output tables. Their calculations showed, that in the building 
sector  there  would  be  125.000  more  jobs  from  2010  till  2014,  in  the 
8 Crandall et al. (2007), p. 9
9 cf. Crandall et al. (2007), p.9ff
10 cf. Stefan Heng in “Broadband infrastructure”, Deutsche Bank Research, May 2010, p.3
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telecommunication  sector  28.400  and  in  the  manufacturing  of  electronic 
devices  4.700,  respectively  (total:  304.000).  71.000  jobs  would  be  created 
through effects in other economic sectors and another 75.000 ones through 
induced job creation. If  Germany built  an “ultra-broadband-network” till 
2020, another 237.000 jobs could be created. So, totally, in Germany 541.000 
jobs could be created between 2010 and 2020.11
There  is  also  a  wide  range  of  indirect  effects  of  extending  broadband-
networks, from product to process innovations, from new possibilities in 
R&D to new organisational structures. 
While  the Internet  is  being used for  almost 20  years  now,  most  services 
became possible  only  because  of  higher  bandwidth.  In  recent  years,  the 
Internet  especially  became  a  substitute  to  traditional  telecommunication 
methods.  Voice  over  IP,  chat-programs  (e.g.  ICQ,  MSN  Messenger)  and 
social networks (e.g. Facebook) are an integral part of people's lives today. 
They  make  it  easier  to  share  information  with  large  amounts  of  other 
individuals  and  thus  replace  traditional  ways  of  communication.  This 
process might become even faster in the upcoming years. Precondition for 
the boundless use is a sufficient state of broadband endowment. 
The benefits of this process are hard to measure, but it is clear, that it helps 
individuals  as  well  as  companies  in  several  ways.  There is  not  only  the 
positive effect of easier networking, but also, for example, a higher speed in 
decision  transmission,  which  lets  firms  being  faster  to  react  on  certain 
11 cf. Katz et al. (2009), “Die Wirkung des Breitbandausbaus auf Arbeitsplätze und die 
deutsche Volkswirtschaft”, p. 14
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events.  Furthermore,  distances  do  not  matter  that  much  any  more.  It  is 
easier and much cheaper to hold a conference on the Internet than to bring 
people from all over the world together in a certain place. 
A conclusion  of  several  studies  about  the  use  of  IT  and  CT,  which  are 
outlined  in  the  OECD-report,  can  be,  that  increased  adoption  of  both, 
Information  Technologies  as  well  as  Communication  Technologies, 
heightens productivity.12
12 cf. OECD (2007), “Broadband and Economy”, p. 20ff
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Part II. Economic and legal background
3 Recent regulation strategies in the EU  
3.1 The liberalisation process  
The  European  Commission  first  decided  to  aim  at  the  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications industry in 1987, which was rather late compared to 
other developed countries13.
Before  the  liberalisation  process  started,  the  typical  structure  of 
telecommunications  markets  in  Europe  were  national  monopolies  with 
hardly any competition between the member states. The plan was to open 
up markets to private companies by piecewise liberalisation, starting with 
the terminal equipment sector in 198814. 
The new Service Directive of 1996 provided the step to full liberalization of 
telecommunications services,  coming into effect on 1st of January, 1998 in 
most countries within the EU15. Compared to that, the US liberalised local 
markets in 1996.
13 “In the US, the first license to compete for public switched long-distance services was 
granted in 1969 (operational 1972), and in 1980 the market for long-distance services was 
effectively liberalized. In Japan, the Telecommunication Business Law of 1985 liberalized 
most telecommunication markets”. Source: Kiessling, Boundeel (1998), p.575.
14 Vgl. Kiessling and Blondeel (1998), p. 575
15 Due to special conditions, the dates for full liberalisation differed for some EU member 
states: Luxembourg: July 1998; Spain: December 1998; Ireland and Portugal: January 
2000; Greece: January 2001. Source: Kiessling and Blondeel (1998), p.575
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The main objectives of the liberalisation process in the EU were to ensure 
“efficient allocation of resources, technical efficiency, innovative efficiency 
and fair competition”16, whereas this should be achieved by “implementing 
cost-oriented and non-excessive prices, minimizing cost of production, the 
provision of new services that satisfy evolving user needs, and ensuring fair 
network access and interconnection conditions and the absence of predatory 
pricing.”17  
It is clear, that there are trade-offs between some of these policy objectives. 
For  example,  an  obligation  for  resale  to  force  competition  (i.e.  service 
competition)  lowers  the  incentives  to  competition  in  the  infrastructure 
sector and so to invest in innovative processes. 
3.2 The 2002 commission guidelines  
The active rules, which act as the main basis for regulatory authorities are 
the  “Commission  guidelines  on  market  analysis  and  the  assessment  of 
significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services” from 200218 which base 
on five directives19.
16 Kiessling and Blondeel (1998), p. 571
17 Kiessling and Blondeel (1998), p. 572
18 EU, Office Journal 2002/C165/03
19 This new regulatory framework comprises five Directives (Source: “Commission 
guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services” (2002/C165/03), Article 2):
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The new framework provides rules for defining markets, which come into 
consideration for ex-ante regulation for the national regulation authorities 
being consistent with European competition law. The NRA are allowed to 
put commitments on the affected firms, as long as competition is distorted 
with regard to dominant positions as defined in Article 82 of EC Treaty. This 
represents a difference to the initial guidelines from 1998, where European 
competition law was not included. The aim of the new directive is to help 
the  NRA with  the  definition  of  markets  and  the  detection  of  market 
domination. 
The  regulation  authorities  should  try  to  achieve  the  objectives  of 
“promotion  of  an  open  and  competitive  market  for  electronic 
communications networks, services and associated facilities; development 
of the internal market;  promotion of the interests of European citizens”20. 
“Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, the 'framework Directive';
Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, the 'authorisation 
Directive'; 
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities, the 'access Directive';
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, the 'universal service Directive'; 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. 
However, until this last Directive is formally adopted, Directive 97/66/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council concerning the processing of personal data and 
protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, the 'data protection Directive', 
remains the relevant Directive”.
20 “Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services” (2002/C165/03), Article 15
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Through ex-ante obligations it should be ensured, that firms cannot exhibit 
possible market power and hence distort competition. The authorities' duty 
thereby is to investigate whether there is 'effective competition' in each of 
the  markets,  which  may be  subject  to  ex-ante  regulation  defined by the 
commission or not. 
The definition of 'effective competition' is therefore a core element of the 
process. If the authorities detect effective competition, they are not allowed 
to  impose  any  regulation  measures  on  any  firm  in  the  specific  market. 
Following  the  framework  directive,  a  market  is  not  ruled  by  effective 
competition if “there are one or more undertakings with significant market 
power, and where national and Community competition law remedies are 
not sufficient to address the problem.”21 
If the NRAs decide, that there is no efficient competition in a market, they 
can impose special  obligations on the dominant firm(s),  which may also 
include  obligations  for  access  and  interconnection.  Because  of  the  wide 
range of trade-offs between the objectives for the NRAs, they have a wide 
latitude of judgement, which is limited by Articles 6 and 7 of the framework 
Directive22. 
21 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 7 March 2002 on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L108/36
22   cf. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, Official Journal of the European Communities, Articles 6,7, L108/40-41
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4 Definition of new and emerging markets  
4.1 The concept of the SSNIP – test for static markets  
In order to fight uncompetitive behaviour it is important to know how a 
market actually is defined. The exact  definition of a market gives us the 
possibility  to  calculate  market  shares  and  provides  an  overview,  which 
firms are able to limit another firm's uncompetitive behaviour.
The definition of the European Union for a product market goes like this:
“A relevant  product  market  comprises  all  those products  and/or  services 
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by 
reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use”23.
A relevant geographical market is defined as follows:
“The  relevant  geographic  market  comprises  the  area  in  which  the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products 
or  services,  in  which  the  conditions  of  competition  are  sufficiently 
homogeneous  and  which  can  be  distinguished  from neighbouring  areas 
because  the  conditions  of  competition  are  appreciably  different  in  those 
area”24.
The most common method to define a market is the SSNIP-test, which is 
23 EU Official Journal C372, 09/12/1997, “Commission Notice on the definition of relevant 
market for the purposes of Community competition law”
24 EU Official Journal C372, 09/12/1997, „Commission Notice on the definition of relevant 
market for the purposes of Community competition law“
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favoured  by  many  economists  as  well  as  by  the  EU  and  US  antitrust 
divisions25.
It is a thought experiment, which should find out, if a small, but significant, 
non-transitory increase of a product's price26 – usually 5% or 10% - would 
increase  a  hypothetical  monopolist's27 profit  (cet.  par.)  or  if  consumers 
would change to a close substitute of the product, so that the loss caused by 
this substitution effect would be higher than the increase in prices benefits 
the  hypothetical  monopolist.  If  that  increase  in  price  is  profitable,  the 
market is defined by the product(s) in question. If it is not profitable, one 
has to add another close substitute and repeat the whole procedure. This is 
done  until  the  increase  in  prices  is  profitable  for  the  hypothetical 
monopolist. 
“In  other  words,  the  SSNIP test  defines  a  market  as  the  smallest  set  of 
products worth monopolising.”28 The substitution effect, which causes the 
loss of sales,  in this case could be a demand or supply side substitution 
effect.  The  first  one  tells  us,  if  there  are  any  close  substitutes  for  the 
consumers to the products in question, while the second one tells us, how 
easy it would be for another firm to change its production to the product in 
question profitably.29 
25 “There is now growing consensus that the hypothetical monopolist test provides the 
appropriate framework for defining relevant markets”; Baker, Bishop (2001), “Role of 
market definition” p.1
26 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”, 
April 2, 1992
27 i.e. the product in question is in the thought experiment only produced by one supplier
28 Baker, Bishop (2001), “Role of market definition”, p. 7
29 cf. Baker, Bishop (2001), “Role of market definition”, p. 7
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4.2 General problems of the SSNIP-test  
At the first glance, the SSNIP-test seems to be a perfect tool for assessing the 
“borders”  of  any market.  But  in  some cases  it  implies  critical  problems, 
which distort the results in a crucial way.
First of all, in all non-merger cases, the “Cellophane Phallacy” is a serious 
problem.  This  phenomenon  describes  the  fact,  that  in  situations,  where 
uncompetitive behaviour should be detected, the SSNIP – test asks for an 
increase  in  prices,  based  on  probably  already  uncompetitive,  say 
monopolist, prices. Thus, the hypothetical price increase will in any case be 
unprofitable,  because  the  monopolist  already  maximizes  her  profits  by 
charging the monopoly price. In fact, in this case, the test should ask for a 
price  increase,  based  on  the  competitive  prices,  which  only  can  be 
measured. If this is not done, the application of the SSNIP – test could lead 
to  a  too  broad  definition  of  the  market.  Then,  the  market  shares  of  the 
uncompetitive firm are found to be rather low, and the firm is misleadingly 
not investigated.
The name “Cellophane Phallacy” has its seeds in the “du Pont”-case. Du 
Pont  sold  cellophane  and  argued,  that  it  competed  with  other  packing 
materials.  This  result  was also found by the SSNIP-test,  whereas in fact, 
cellophane  was  only  in  competition  with  other  packing  materials  at  the 
monopoly  prices,  du  Pont  charged.  At  competitive  prices,  cellophane 
formed an own market and thus, du Pont had a dominant position30.
30 cf. Motta (2004), p. 105; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_but_Significant_and_Non-
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Another problem of the SSNIP-test is, that it is not so easy to find enough 
data to apply the test in order to get significant results. If this is the case, 
competition authorities often use surveys to assess, whether a price increase 
of a product would lead to high or low reduction in demand.
4.3 Characteristics and problems when defining a new market  
Up  to  this  point,  we  only  talked  about  already  existing  and  stationary 
markets.  Since  our  focus  lies  on  markets,  that  change  over  time,  the 
presented arguments have to be adjusted to new markets and situations, 
where investment and innovation change the structure of the industry.
4.3.1 What, actually is a “new” market?  
At first, it is important to know, what a “new market” actually means in the 
sense of this paper. 
There is the case, that a new market evolves without introduction of a new 
technology  or  even  product.  Changes  in  preferences  could  lead  to  new 
markets, for example, if people suddenly become eager for a certain brand. 
In this paper, this kind of new market is not subject of interest. Here, we 
focus on those, which really base on completely new things. Innovations, 
that  change  the  whole  structure  of  the  industry  and  are  not  or  hardly 
transitory_Increase_in_Price (visited on June 11th, 2010)
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substitutable with any existing technology. 
Also small  technological  innovations are mostly not new markets  in our 
sense. A small increase of the bandwidth of DSL is nice for the consumers, 
but in general it is not enough to form a new market. On the other hand, the 
jump from 56kBit/s  dial-up  modems  to  1Mbit/s  or  more  highspeed-DSL 
connections has most likely formed a new market. 
Generally speaking, not every new product, that is released, automatically 
evokes a “new market”. For example, a cable connection has the same or 
almost the same properties for the end-user as a DSL-connection. Assume, 
that there already was a DSL-network and then another supplier came up 
with a cable-connection.  This  is  a  new product,  but  certainly not a  new 
market,  since the difference for  the user  between cable and DSL is  very 
small. Both ways to use highspeed-internet most likely belong to the same 
market. A SSNIP-test or other economic methods may give us the chance to 
economically test, if other products belong to this market as well (maybe 
mobile internet via modem, mobile internet on the mobile phone, etc.).
On the other hand, such a new process for supplying a service can very well 
become a new market on the wholesale level. This is especially the case, if 
the new process, which provides a final product with similar properties as 
the  old  process,  is  much  cheaper  or  has  other  characteristics  which 
substantially  differ  from  the  old  process  (for  example  less  labour  force 
needed). But then an asymmetry may arise, as Vogelsang (2006) points out. 
Because of the cheaper new process the old product with the higher price is 
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no longer a substitute for the new product for the end-user, while the new 
product - with the same physical conditions and a lower price as the old 
product - would always be a substitute to the old one.31
4.3.2 The SSNIP-test and new markets  
When looking at the definition of new markets, the SSNIP-test implies some 
severe problems. First of all, the missing data argument becomes even more 
serious. As argued, it is not easy to find enough data for stationary markets 
to define them properly. For emerging markets, there are no data available 
at all in most of the cases, because there could not have been any monitoring 
for the prices of the young market. 
Another problem is, that the technological progress is very fast in the sector 
of telecommunications and thus, the definition of a market often has only a 
very short validity. 
So, for the definition of the market, it is important to have a forward-looking 
view on the  situation.  Nearly  the  same service  can  be  provided by  two 
different suppliers  with different technologies (as an example, take cable 
modem vs. DSL technology, again). So, if a firm provides a new service and 
thus has high market shares in the beginning, one has to take into account 
“a larger range of potential suppliers of the service”32 in the future. Thus, a 
firm's  high  market  shares  when  introducing  a  new  service,  could  be 
31 cf. Vogelsang (2006), pp. 19, 20
32 Gual (2003), p. 39
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substituted in the middle or long run by new technologies. For the analysis  
of market definition it is important that the measurement takes into account 
a longer time range, so that supply responses by other firms are included.
Gual (2003) criticises that “this forward-looking view of markets is usually 
missing in the definition of markets in the telecoms industry”33 and points 
out the example of the merger between Sprint and MCIWorldCom, where, 
in  the  author's  view,  the  large  shares  of  the  backbone  market  of  these 
companies would not have been able to last sustainably.34 He concludes that 
“in sum, the regulatory authorities have tended to be fairly conservative 
when  establishing  relevant  markets  in  the  emerging  segments  of  the 
telecoms industry”35
5 Basic ideas for regulation of new markets  
5.1 Overview  
When  having  defined  the  relevant  markets,  the  question  arises,  how to 
handle  every  single  market  from  a  regulatory  perspective.  Are  there 
advantages of a short time monopoly, which helps innovative processes and 
if  so,  how long  should  these  so-called  “regulatory  holidays”  for  such  a 
monopoly be accepted?
33 Gual (2003), p.39
34 cf.. Gual (2003), p. 41
35 Gual (2003), p.41
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In order to have a closer look onto this question, I will present some main 
ideas  of  dynamic  competition  and  will  explain,  why  looking  at  static 
concepts as traditional antitrust and regulatory schemes do, is most likely 
not the appropriate tool for new markets in telecommunications industry.
5.2 Dynamic competition  
Dynamic competition is  a  huge field of  study and could be subject  of  a 
single paper. In this context, I only want to outline some aspects of dynamic 
competition which could be interesting for our topic. 
To start with and relate dynamic competition to our issue, I will provide a 
statement from Baake et al. (2007) and investigate its meanings. They say, 
that, “usually, creation of a new market does not call for active regulation”36. 
The theory behind this statement is as follows. 
Take  the  situation  of  a  state  of  static  efficiency  (i.e.  a  competitive 
equilibrium), where one undertaking introduces a new product or service. 
As the other firms see, that the innovator gets rents for her innovation, they 
will follow and try to imitate her, which will eventually result in another 
static equilibrium after some time.  37
Since there is by definition no market-based static efficiency in a regulated 
market (this is being tried to enforce by active regulation), it is not clear, 
36 Baake et al., (2007), p. 124
37 cf. Baake et al., (2007), p. 125
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how innovations influence that kind of markets and how the market should 
be treated from a regulatory perspective. Before we treat this question more 
detailed, I will have a closer look at the relation and tradeoff between static 
and dynamic efficiency. 
5.2.1 Static vs. dynamic efficiency  
In standard neo-classical economic literature, static or allocative efficiency is 
the most important normative concept. When all individuals maximize their 
utility and firms maximize their profits, the economy will evolve towards a 
general equilibrium, where all markets clear and where there is no way to 
improve one individual's utility or firm's profit without harming another 
one's.  In  neoclassical  concepts,  this  competitive  equilibrium  maximizes 
welfare. Thus, this state of static efficiency is usually the aim in competition 
policy to reach. In this static world, any distortion of perfect competition as 
monopolies  or oligopolies  reduce total  welfare and create a dead-weight 
loss. 
According  to  Schumpeter,  not  static  equilibria  ensure  highest  possible 
welfare in a capitalist economy, but innovations, endogenously created and 
driven by the capitalist's will to be one step ahead and thus make higher 
profits than her competitors.38 “The basic impulse, that actuate capitalism, 
comes from competition for new goods, production and transport processes 
and organizational models.”39 
38 cf. Schumpeter (1950), p. 134ff.
39 Schumpeter (1950), p. 137 (translation)
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“[Schumpeter]  argued,  that  allocation  in  the  static  environments  was  an 
unimportant phenomenon compared with the enormous innovations that 
capitalist economies produced.”40 Based on this, as Baake et al. point out41, 
Schumpeter  formed  two  hypotheses,  which  should  explain  capitalist 
economies in a better way than the concept of static efficiency does. 
In  both  hypotheses,  the  static  equilibrium  is  disturbed  by  a  drastic 
innovation of an entrepreneur, who followingly makes profits through her 
innovation. 
In  what  is  called  Schumpeter's  “first  theory”  (1934)  in  Baake  et  al.,  he 
assumes, that other firms start to adjust or drop out of the market  and after 
some time, in which the innovator earns higher (monopoly) profits, a new 
competitive equilibrium emerges. Thus, “catching-up competition” ensures, 
that  monopolies  are  only  a  temporary  phenomenon.  Moreover,  other 
entrepreneurs  market  new  innovations  and  become  monopolists  by 
themselves  or  even  crowd  the  old  innovator  out  of  the  market,  what 
Schumpeter refers to as “creative destruction”42. 
“The opening up of new markets and the organizational development from 
the craft shop and factory to such concerns as US Steel illustrate the process 
of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure 
from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
40 Dynamic Competition and Public Policy, Ellig (2001), p. 17
41 cf. Baake et al. (2007), p. 380ff.
42 cf. Schumpeter, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1975; orig.pub. 1942) pp. 82-85.
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one ... [The process] must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction;  it  cannot  be  understood  on  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  a 
perennial lull.”43
In  his  counter  theory,  Schumpeter  assumes,  that,  by  implementing  her 
innovation,  the  innovator  creates  a  competitive  advantage  for  the  next 
innovation, and thus, it is easier for her to make the next step compared to 
her competitors. In the end, the process would not result in a competitive 
equilibrium again, but in a monopolistic economy. Catching-up competition 
then plays a minor role and the increasingly concentrated markets call for 
regulatory invention, if welfare should be maximized.
While  it  is  not  clear,  which  of  the  two  theories  is  empirically  “true”44, 
Schumpeter's  work  shows,  that  innovation  is  driven  by  the  innovator's 
incentive to earn monopoly profits and that without the pure possibility of 
existence of a monopoly, firms would not take the large costs for R&D and 
for uncertain investments, respectively. 
Thus, what the story tells us, is, that with a competition or regulatory policy, 
which  only  aims  for  allocative  or  static  efficiency,  where  monopoly  or 
market  power  are  undesirable,  there  are  hardly  any  incentives  for 
innovation  and  thus  technological  progress.  The  same  story  is  true  for 
investment. If a firm has to bear high costs for investment in infrastructure 
and through regulation, every competitor could utilize the infrastructure as 
43 Schumpeter, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1975; orig.pub. 1942) p. 82.
44 cf. Discussion in Baake et al. (2007), p. 385
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well, the firm might not induce the investment.  Furthermore, firms with 
higher market power have more financial resources to invest into R&D or 
take the risk for innovations or investment. So, “market power arising from 
innovation is itself an incentive for innovation”45.
5.2.2 Innovations from an entrepreneur's perspective  
Whenever a company plans to make an investment, the 'simple' question is, 
if the returns from the investment would be higher than the costs in order to 
really  enforce  the  investment.  Of  course,  in  reality  this  is  not  a  simple 
question,  because  both  costs  and  to  a  much  higher  degree  the  possible 
returns are uncertain. 
Especially when talking about an innovation, for which there might be high 
development costs, no one can predict how long it would take a company to 
finish the development of the innovation in order to bring the ready product 
to the market. And, in the worst case, the innovation totally fails, so it might 
never become a saleable product and the firm only has to pay the costs for 
an unsuccessful development.
But even, if the probability, that the innovative product could become ready 
for the market, is very high, there is still significant uncertainty for the firm 
when selling the product. 
Of  course  this  depends  crucially  on  the  type  of  innovation.  If  it  is,  for 
45 Ellig (2001), p. 19
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example, a drastic innovation, the possible profits are significantly higher 
than in  the case,  where it  is  only a  slight  improvement  of  a production 
process.  The probabilities  for  completion of  the product  depend also  on 
that, whereas they are most likely much smaller for such a true innovation 
to be successful. 
If  the (drastic or not) innovation is successful from the technical point of 
view and the product is released on the market, there is still a wide range of 
uncertainties left for the firm. 
The first arises from the fact, that not every innovation makes its way to fit 
people's needs. It depends on the entrepreneur's ability to bring a product 
to the people, who demand it, which includes marketing and advertisement 
abilities. 
The  second,  most  important  (especially  for  the  regulatory  policy) 
uncertainty is, how long the company can hold its monopoly. If the firm acts 
on a very competitive market, other companies might adjust very quickly 
and  imitate  the  innovator  which  might  lead  to  an  almost  competitive 
equilibrium very soon, where no firm earns very high profits any more. In 
this case, the innovator might not be able to cover the costs she spent for the 
development of the innovation before. On the other hand, if it is hard for 
other firms to imitate the innovator, she will get the monopoly profits for a 
long  time.  In  the  extreme  case,  the  process  will  lead  to  a  permanent 
monopoly without any competition, much higher profits than investment 
for the innovator and high dead weight losses in the middle and long run.
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In  telecommunications  industry  in  Europe,  where  we  already  have  a 
regulated  market  with  an  incumbent  (the  former  monopolist)  and  a 
competitive fringe, these ideas become even more complicated. 
The main aim for an incumbent is to try to keep her market shares against 
the entrants. In order to prevent losing market shares despite of the fact that  
the incumbent is regulated and new entrants come into the market, she has 
high incentives to being one step ahead in contrast to the competitors. Thus, 
the incumbent naturally has high incentives to innovate and also has the 
possibilities to do so. Since she could acquire monopoly profits for a long 
time,  she  usually  has  the  capital  and  technical  abilities  to  innovate. 
Additionally,  if  the  new  market  is  not  regulated  in  the  beginning,  the 
incumbent  can  exploit  the  monopoly  profits  very  well  (e.g.  through 
economics of scope; advertisement, etc.). 
On the other hand, the replacement effect may counteract innovations by 
the  incumbent.  “Replacement  effect”  means,  that  an  innovation  by  the 
incumbent  would  “steal”  profits  from  her  old  market  or  a  former 
innovation.  Baake et  al.  (2007)  considers  this  “business  stealing effect  as 
rather unproblematic”46
The entrants/competitors do not face such a replacement effect. Thus, we 
expect  a  wider possible  range of  innovations  for  the competitors,  which 
could  seek  parts  of  the  incumbent's  rents.  The  probability  for  a 
revolutionary innovation is  probably higher,  because there  is  no  already 
46 Baake et al. (2007), p. 394
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existing infrastructure which could be used by the competitors and so they 
have a higher incentive to find completely  new ways of  providing their 
services or products.47
One example, which might go in this direction, is the case of Hutchinson in 
Austria,  which  tried to build up a network for mobile internet with the 
brand  “3”.  The  incumbent  “Telekom  Austria”  is  very  active  in  the 
broadband internet sector, where “3” has no influence at all.  It might be, 
that the entrant Hutchinson was a bit  faster with implementing the new 
technology rather than the incumbent's branch “Mobilkom Austria”.48
Finally,  competitors  might  profit  from  regulation  of  areas  where  the 
incumbent has a dominant position. Then they can innovate in other, up- or 
downstream, areas, what might not be possible without regulation.49 
5.3 Regulation strategies  
5.3.1 Traditional Regulation  
The discussion hitherto  brings  us  to  the  point,  where we try  to  find an 
“optimal”  regulation  strategy.  In  a  dynamic  economy  as  the 
47 cf. Vogelsang (2006), p. 29
48 http://drei.at/portal/de/privat/unternehmen/uberuns/was_ist_3g/Unternehmen_H3G_3  
G.html  (visited on June,  5th, 2010) 
http://drei.at/portal/media/960/privat/unternehmen/presse/pressemappe/Facts_Figures.
pdf  (visited on June, 5th, 2010)
49 cf. Vogelsang (2006), p. 32
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telecommunications  industry,  we  have  to  focus  on  a  regulatory  scheme, 
which  allows  for  investment  and  innovations.  A framework  has  to  be 
established,  in  which  firms  can  be  sure,  that  they  get  returns  for  their 
investment, but no permanent monopolies show up. 
Traditionally,  the  main  regulatory  scheme,  which  is  “based  on  static 
efficiency and built on a system of cost-based regulation”50 brings up severe 
problems, when we want to achieve the aforesaid aims. Here, a “logic of 
static efficiency is applied directly to dynamic problems.”51 Of course, this 
brings  up  some  problems,  which  have  to  be  solved  in  order  to  foster 
investment and technological progress. 
One main problem with traditional regulatory schemes is the “free-rider” 
option  for  competitors,  who  do  not  have  to  take  any  investment,  but 
through  regulation,  they  are  still  able  to  use  infrastructure  built  by  the 
incumbent. Thus, the incumbent has to bear high risks when building the 
network,  but  probably could not recover her  costs,  because the earnings 
diminish, if competitors could use the infrastructure through regulation in 
the same way as the incumbent did. 
Hence, traditional cost-based regulation affects the incumbent's incentives 
for innovation by price caps with possible profits from the innovation being 
reduced  or,  in  the  worst  case,  with  making  the  whole  innovation 
unprofitable. 52 
50 Baake et al. (2007), p. 406
51 Baake et al. (2007), p. 406
52 cf. Vogelsang (2006), p. 32
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Baake et al. (2007) add, that “cost-based regulation of entry […] also defeats 
the  aim  of  creating  structurally  secure  (i.e.  infrastructure-based) 
competition”.53 Whether infrastructure-based competition is an aim rather 
than service-based competition is discussed broadly. Kittl et al., for instance, 
put it that way: “There are clear signs that infrastructure-based competition 
is more  important to business customers and service-based competition is 
more  important  for  residential  customers.  Therefore,  if  the  majority  of 
consumers  are  also  to  be  able  to  benefit  from  competition  then  both 
liberalisation strategies will have to be in place – in a balanced approach.”54
In 2002, the EU brought up guidelines for NRAs how to handle regulation 
of telecommunications industry, whereas they focused in some abstracts on 
new and emerging markets. Before I go on, I will have a look on how much 
the EU could integrate dynamic competition theory in their law so far. 
5.3.2 The EU guidelines again  
The EU guidelines answer the question of how to treat emerging markets in 
§32 of the framework in a somewhat fuzzy way: It  says,  that “emerging 
markets,  where de facto the market leader is likely to have a substantial 
market share, should not be subject to inappropriate ex-ante regulation”. On 
the  other  hand,  “foreclosure  of  such  emerging  markets  by  the  leading 
undertaking should be  prevented” and,  generally,  “NRAs should ensure 
53 Baake et al. (2007), p. 407
54 Kittl et al. (2006), “Infrastructure-based versus service-based: competition in 
telecommunications”. 
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that  they  can  fully  justify  any  form  of  early,  ex-ante  intervention  in  an 
emerging market”55. 
An interpretation of this paragraph could be, that, as long as a pioneering 
role of the new market leader exists, it should be freed from regulation, but 
once other undertakings have the chance to participate in the new market 
(i.e. the pioneering role does not exist any longer), the regulatory authorities 
should focus on competition by implementing regulatory measures.
This fuzzy formulation is quite a source for uncertainty. If an undertaking 
does not exactly know, how long it can keep a monopoly after making an 
investment, the uncertainty might be too big to risk an investment into new 
technology infrastructure. 
The monopoly profits of a too short or uncertain time period ex-ante might 
not be enough to cover the costs for the investment and so the investment 
simply isn't done. As exemplified in Chapter 2, this may lead to significant 
dead-weight losses. On the other hand, if such a “pioneer monopoly”, as 
defined in the next chapter, existed too long, competition might be harmed. 
The result would again be a significant dead-weight loss.
5.3.3 The concept of regulatory holidays  
According  to  standard  economic  literature,  a  static  monopoly  is 
55 EU guidelines 2002/C165/03, §32
40
characterised by a lack of competition, i.e.  one firm can choose whatever 
output  it  can  realize  while  maximizing  its  profits  with  that  amount  of 
output.  US  antitrust  law  (1997)  specifies  the  definition,  as  written  in 
“Dynamic  competition  and  public  policy”:  “A  Firm  is  engaged  in 
monopolization,  if  it  employs  'exclusionary'  practices,  but  not,  if  it 
dominates its market due to superior skill, foresight and industry or as a 
consequence  of  a  superior  product,  business  acumen  or  historical 
accident”.56
Thus, the special case of a monopoly in question is one, which arises due to 
technical  progress  and  investment  into  the  according  necessary 
infrastructure. If a firm manages to create and sell a totally new product, 
which  economically  has  no  substitutes  (i.e.  the  product  forms  a  new 
relevant market) and fulfils the definition of a monopoly above, we can talk 
about a “pioneer monopoly” as defined by Vogelsang (2006)57. 
In  such  situations,  according  to  what  we  called  the  first  Schumpeterian 
theory in this paper,  other firms usually start to imitate the innovator or 
come up with even better innovations, which leads to a limited time frame 
where the monopolist really is a pioneer58. 
When interpreting the EU guidelines like I did in this paper, they propose to 
not regulate a pioneer monopoly as long as there really is the pioneer status 
56 Ellig (2001), p. 1, cf. Department of justice and federal trade commission, 1997, 
Horizontal merger guidelines.
57 cf. Vogelsang (2006) p. 32
58 Despite of patents or no possibilities to copy (e.g. due to secrecy).
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of the innovator, which is referred to as regulatory holidays.
Since  this  policy  helps  innovators  to  exploit  their  monopoly  profits 
compared  to  a  strict  regulatory  scheme,  it  may  give  incentives  to 
innovations.  Furthermore,  for  both,  incumbents  or  competitors/entrants, 
there are some special advantages, which facilitate innovations in a pioneer 
monopoly policy framework. 
An incumbent, for example, can easily add the new product to her existing 
sales  mix,  which  thereby  has  a  significant  advantage  compared  to  any 
competitor's product proposals. In the “worst” case for the competitors, the 
incumbent  can  attract  the  whole  old  market,  which  may  end  up  in  a 
dominant position of  the incumbent  not only in the market  for the new 
product  but  also  in  the  one for  the  sales  mix or  even the  old products. 
Therefore,  incumbents might find a way to avoid regulation of  their  old 
markets by taking advantage of introducing new products  using pioneer 
monopoly policy.
Competitors are usually not in the sights of regulators, because there is no 
need to  think  about  regulation  of  firms  which  are  far  away from being 
dominant. Anyway, a drastic innovation can lead to a dominant position, 
even if it is provided by a competitor or entrant. So, the non-regulation of 
pioneer  monopolies  may  help  competitors  who  act  as  innovators,  too. 
However, the advantages seem not to be as big as for incumbents. The latter 
have more financial and technical resources to react to new technologies 
brought  up.  So  it  is  harder  for  entrants  to  utilize  the  bonus  of  a  new 
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technology, because the initial incumbent might already have another, even 
better  technology  in  her  drawer.  Since  an  entrant  is  not  subject  of  any 
regulatory measure, she can not profit from cancelling regulation due to the 
new product.
Whether  regulatory  holidays  should  be  granted  for  a  certain  service  or 
product, is not a simple question.
First of all, it is not sure, that due to an innovation or investment there is 
really a new market created. To assess this,  a transformed version of the 
SSNIP-test as described in Chapter 3 can be used. Of course, this test can not 
be applied before the investment is done, which leaves some uncertainty to 
the investor. Since the corresponding data is needed anyway, Baake et al. 
propose  to  wait  four  years  before  the  test  is  performed59 to  reduce  the 
uncertainty for the investor and give her some time to exploit the monopoly 
profits. 
The  somewhat  transformed  question  of  the  SSNIP-test  now  would  be: 
“What  percentage  of  customers  in  the  new market  would  revert  to  the 
products of the old market, if the prices of the products available four years 
ago fell in real terms [...] by 20 percent?”60 They state, that there is a new 
market created for sure, if “less than 20 percent of customers would revert 
to the old products.”61
59 cf. Baake et al. (2007), p. 409
60 Baake et al. (2007), p. 410
61 Baake et al. (2007), p. 410
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On the other hand, four years is a long period, in which the investor already 
could attract a lot of customers and thus create a long-lasting monopoly. As 
we will see in the next chapter, there are models, in which it is proposed to 
grant an even longer period for regulatory holidays due to other reasons.
Regulatory holidays can also be compared to patent monopolies, which also 
should enable investors to account for their expenditures and their risk.
Similarly  to  the  patents,  a  too  rigid  competition  policy  (i.e.  a  too  early 
interdiction of a monopoly by an NRA after an investment or innovation) 
can lead to a state, where no investments are done at all, because fixed costs 
for R&D or the deployment of the infrastructure and the corresponding risk 
for future revenues are too high. 
Another  fact  which  has  to  be  added to  the  risk  for  telecommunications 
markets compared to patents is, that the investor cannot be sure, how his 
service  is  treated  by  the  regulatory  authority  in  the  future.  A patent  is 
granted a fixed time period, in which the innovator can be sure, that she can 
exploit  the  monopoly  profits.  For  innovators  in  the  telecommunications 
sector, changing regulatory strategies through different policies by NRAs or 
even changes in the national or EU-wide framework on how to treat certain 
markets could interrupt their plans. Since the decision, if an investment is 
made, is ruled, before the investment is actually done, the investor has to 
know ex-ante if it is profitable for her to do so. Therefore, one challenge for 
regulatory authorities is to credibly guarantee, which policy they are going 
to enforce in order to minimize the investor's uncertainty.
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An example for regulatory holidays for broadband networks is South Korea. 
There,  alternative network operators can only get  access to  already built 
fibre optic networks, if they are deployed before 2004.62 
5.3.4 A model for regulating new markets  
As presented in the last chapter, regulatory holidays can be a way to foster 
investment into infrastructure. Baake et al. (2007) have developed a model, 
which describes a way of how to deal with new markets from a regulatory 
perspective in detail.
As argued above, it is not clear, if an investor should be granted regulatory 
holidays for a new product or service after an innovation and moreover, it is 
not clear, how long this state should prevail, if so.
If the transformed SSNIP-test presented above detects after four years, that 
the innovation did not create a new market at all, the result is quite easy. 
The regulatory offices then have to react, as if the seeming new market was 
a typical market, which underlies regulation. 
If,  otherwise,  the  SSNIP-test  leads  to  a  result,  where  a  new  market  is 
detected, the question is not so easy to answer. On one hand, the investor 
still  has  significant  market  power  on  his  new  market  and  thus,  static 
efficiency is disturbed, which would call for regulation. On the other hand, 
the aim here is to create dynamic efficiency, which – as Schumpeter argued 
62 Jaag et al. (2009), p. 51
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–  seems  to  be  more  important  than  static  efficiency  for  an  economy. 
Therefore, it is possibly necessary at this point to keep the protection of the 
innovator  to  give her  the chance to  recoup her  expenditures.  As argued 
above, and as Baake et al. point out, “it is therefore important for the state to 
establish a regulatory framework in which an active regulatory authority 
can be credibly restrained during this phase of the market.”
If,  after these four years,  regulatory holidays are still  granted due to the 
reasons above, the next step must be to ensure, if competition emerges in 
succession. As Fig 2 shows, Baake et al. propose to check this within several 
steps.
Firstly,  six  years  after  the  innovation  is  implemented,  there  should  be 
competing infrastructure rising up in order to limit the market power of the 
investor.  For  the  case  of  broadband,  this  could  be  mobile  networks,  for 
instance.   If  within  this  period,  there  are  no  signs,  that  alternative 
infrastructure is built, the model calls for regulation.
In  the  next  step,  another  two years  ahead,  the  model  calls  for  growing 
market shares of competitors. Baake et al. propose, that alternative network 
operators should therefore have shares of over 30 percent.63
63 Baake et al. (2007), p. 413
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After  ten  years,  a  forecast  using  the  SMP-test  is  proposed  in  order  to 
estimate the development of the market in question and if regulation could 
be necessary. 
Fig.2 shows the process for regulation of a potential new market for the model of  
Baake et al. (2007). In this model, it may take twelve years, before any regulation is  
imposed on a new market. 
Finally, after twelve years, the SMP-test is used to assess, if the innovator 
still has significant market power. In this case, finally regulation would be 
applied to the market in question.
Baake  et  al.  argue,  that  their  model  takes  into  account  “investment 
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incentives [...and] telecommunication-specific aspects”.64 Especially the fact, 
that  in  telecommunications  industry,  investment  into  networks  could 
generate new services, which in turn add value to the new network, is here 
important.  The  first  four  years,  which  pass  by  before  any  regulation  is 
thought of, should account for this fact.
Furthermore, Baake et al. see other positive effects when using their model. 
They argue, that, since both, competitors and incumbents are affected by 
their  regulation  framework,  it  was  more  likely  for  infrastructure-based 
competition to show up. 
Another argument for their model is the fact, that undertakings could be 
quite sure about their expectations. They know ex-ante, that the market will 
be unregulated in any case for the first four years. And even after these four 
years, it is not crucial, if competition shows up or not, because in the case 
that  competition does not show up,  regulation comes into consideration. 
Thus, the undertakings again can be rather secure about their expectations. 
They  know,  that  after  the  first  four  years  of  unregulated  state,  their 
monopoly will in any case collapse by and by.
Furthermore, the investor does not have incentives to protect her monopoly 
state any more by preventing successors from market entry, because if they 
did, they knew, that price and/or access regulation would be imposed on 
their product or service.65
64 Baake et al. (2007), p. 414
65 cf. Baake et al. (2005), pp. 133-134
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Most of the arguments provided by Baake et al. to promote their model are 
quite  clear  and  comprehensible.  Anyway,  there  are  still  some  problems, 
which would call for different strategies than the proposed one.
First of all, the first four years, in which regulation is not scheduled at all,  
are a long period. Within this time frame, the innovator could have attracted 
most of the customers, which would lead to a long-lasting monopoly, even, 
if regulation is imposed on the innovator after these four years. Especially 
economies of scale and scope and already established reputation could help 
the  incumbent  to  keep  her  large  market  shares  against  financially  and 
technically  powerless  competitors.  This  phenomenon  is  seen  in 
conventional  telephone  networks  in  many  countries.  Even  though, 
regulation should have enforced competition in this  area during the last 
decade, in many countries, the former monopolist still has very high market 
shares. By not regulating a new market for a long time, this could happen 
again for new markets in the telecommunications sector.
Another  problem  is,  that  market  power  could  be  transferred  to  other 
markets as long as it is not regulated at all. For example, investment into 
infrastructure to serve a wholesale market is likely to result in a monopoly 
on the corresponding retail markets. Previously imposed regulation on old 
wholesale markets become useless in this case and competition is distorted.
Whereas, the authors see a big advantage in competing infrastructure, this 
can  be  a  severe  problem,  too.  Especially  the  case,  where  the  same 
infrastructure  is  built  parallelly,  might  be  inefficient.  Solutions,  where 
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infrastructure  is  built  and  used  commonly  might  lead  to  better  welfare 
results than regulatory holidays that last for a too long period. 
6 Intermediary conclusion and outlook  
In  this  part  of  the work,  I  have presented the economic background for 
regulating new markets. I have demonstrated of how to use a SSNIP-test to 
define markets and how it must be transformed in order to test, if a new 
service or product forms a new market. 
After  giving  insights  into  the  economics  of  dynamic  markets,  I  have 
presented  the  concept  of  regulatory  holidays.  Finally,  I  illustrated  and 
criticised a regulation model, which tries to account for dynamic efficiency 
compared to traditional regulatory policies.
This discussion showed, how difficult the world of dynamic efficiency can 
be. While the model gives several incentives for investment and innovation 
and provides the chance for innovators to exploit monopoly profits for some 
time in order to recoup their investment and bear the risk, it comes up with 
new problems as  too  much and thus  inefficient  investment  into  parallel 
infrastructure or long-lasting monopolies.
To apply the lessons we have learnt in this chapter, in part II of this work, I 
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will have a closer look on the Austrian broadband market. We will see, that 
the country did not do so well when it comes to new generation networks. I 
will focus on the problems and possible solutions for the future.
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Part III: Towards a modern 
broadband infrastructure in Austria
7 Deployment of broadband networks in   
Austria
So  far,  I  have  dealt  with  the  theory  behind  regulation  strategies  and 
proposed some ways of how regulatory offices could react to developments 
of new markets and how investment can be facilitated. In Austria, the RTR 
published a concept, in which they impose several remedies on the market 
leader  Telekom  Austria  for  the  wholesale  market  “wholesale  network 
infrastructure access”66 to help fostering broadband deployment. Anyway, 
as I will argue, only regulatory measures might not be enough to lead to 
satisfying  results,  which  could  advance  Austria  to  a  leading  broadband 
region.
Before  I  will  go  into  detail  with  possible  solutions  for  the  Austrian 
telecommunications Market, I will have a look on recent developments and 
the actual state of broadband deployment in Austria.
66 “Physischer Zugang zu Netzinfrastrukturen (Vorleistungsmarkt)” (Translation), RTR, 
M3/09-73
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7.1 Structure of the broadband market in Austria  
As  Fig  3  shows,  the  main  driver  of  the  development  of  the  market  for 
broadband access in Austria in recent years was mobile broadband. From 
end of  2006 to  the  third quarter  2009,  the  number of  mobile  broadband 
connections increased by almost 500%, while most other types of broadband 
almost  remained  static.  Only  broadband  access  using  DSL,  provided 
through Telekom Austria's pair copper wire network increased as well. 
Fig. 367 shows the development of high speed - internet access in Austria.
67 The graph shows the number of broadband connections on the retail level, which 
includes all internet connections which have a bandwidth higher than 144kbit/s. The 
number of mobile broadband connections represents the number of contracts of mobile 
internet with included data volume higher than 250MB per month. The total number of 
broadband connections by pair copper wire in the network of Telekom Austria is split 
into retail broadband connections by Telekom Austria and connections realised by 
bitstream. Connections using other infrastructure include leased circuits, FTTH, 
Powerline (i.e. broadband access using the electricity grid) and broadband connection 
using satellites. (Source: RTR, “Telekom Monitor” TM1-2010, p. 34)
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Compared to this, unbundled connections almost remained the same over 
the  whole  time.  This  probably  shows,  that,  for  now,  the  maximum  of 
households, where it is efficient for competitors to bear the high fixed costs 
of  collocation68 in  order  to  serve  customers  profitably,  is  reached. 
Furthermore, bit-stream69 access decreased in the considered period. 
As the former monopolist, the Telekom Austria AG (TA) is the only firm 
which  owns  a  nationwide  network  of  pair  copper  wires  in  Austria. 
Therefore, and as the RTR assesses, TA has got a market share of 100% on 
the wholesale market for “wholesale network infrastructure access”70 which 
includes the circuits from main distribution frames/service area interfaces to 
single users. Total profit of the wholesale market for Telekom Austria for 
telephony and internet services was 88,3 million € in the first quarter 201071. 
The wholesale market for high-speed internet in Austria remained almost 
constant in the last years, as Fig. 4 shows. 
68 In order to use main distribution frames (or in some cases serving area interfaces) in an 
unbundled network, alternative network operators are granted to have a room at these 
points, where they can connect their own networks to the unbundled cable of the 
incumbent. This “collocation room” contains their own technical equipment. If there are 
only a few users, which can be served with one collocation, it might be unprofitable to 
do so due to the high fixed costs of rent and technical equipment.
69 “High-speed bit-stream access cannot be considered to be economically or technically 
equivalent to providing access to the copper pair in the local loop, since a high-speed 
bit-stream service requires the new entrant to use the high-speed modems and other 
equipment provided by the incumbent, and that in turn affects the economics of the 
service and places restrictions on the type of modems that the customer of the new 
entrant can buy or rent.” (Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=CELEX:32000Y0923%2802%29:EN:HTML (visited on June, 4th, 2010))
70 cf. RTR “Maßnahmenentwurf” M3/09 – 73, p. 12
71 Http://www.telekomaustria.com/dateien/ergebnis-qu1-2010.pdf  , p. 4 (visited on June 4th, 
2010)
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Fig. 4 (top) shows revenues for  
wholesale broadband markets  
in Austria. The dark blue  
coloured bars show the  
wholesale market for  
transmission speed below  
2Mbit/s, the light blue  
coloured line shows the  
revenues for the wholesale  
market with at least 2 Mbit/s.  
(Source: RTR Telekom 
Monitor TM1/2010, p. 17)
Fig. 5 is a comparison of  
different countries which  
already have built FTTH or  
FTTB connections. South  
Korea is far ahead. Austria is  
not in the list. (Source: 
Hartwig Tauber, FTTH 
Council Europe)
7.2 Recent development of next generation networks (NGNs)  
As in most other developed countries,  Next Generation Networks NGNs 
were a much-discussed issue for the Austrian regulatory agency RTR. 
NGNs  are  defined  as  high-end  networks  which  guarantee  sufficient 
bandwidths for common or future services.72 NGA, next generation access 
describes  the  connections  from main distribution  frames  or  serving  area 
interfaces, respectively, to single households. 
From a technical point of view, new generation networks usually need a 
change  in  infrastructure  technology.  Whereas  today,  in  the  local  loop, 
mostly twisted pair copper wires are used to transmit data from the access 
points (i.e. point of presence; usually main distribution frames or serving 
area interfaces) to single households, in the future, fibre optic transmission 
will be used to ensure higher bandwidths and thus new services, that can 
only be utilized within NGNs. (see Fig. 6). 
72 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 12
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Fig. 6: Today, most broadband connections use pair copper wires (violet coloured).  
As technology advances, more and more of the distance from the main networks to  
single households is replaced by fibre glass. In the end, FTTH prevails, connecting  
every single household via an own fibre glass to the Internet. (Source: A Review of  
certain  markets  included  in  the  Commission's  Recommendation  on  Relevant  
Markets subject to ex ante Regulation, Cave et al. (2006)).
Today, the most common transmission technologies (ADSL, etc.)  still  use 
twisted pair copper wires, facing a pay-off between bandwidth and distance 
and  thus  resulting  in  low  bandwidths  in  rural  areas.   More  advanced 
transmission  technologies  or  a  composition  of  twisted  pair  copper  and 
fibreglass  wires  could  increase  transmission  speed,  even  if  fibre  optic 
transmission is not exclusively used. Usually, for FTTC and FTTB, such a 
composition is  used,  facilitated by VDSL technology in  the  serving  area 
interface or the analogous infrastructure at the building for FTTB. FTTH is 
the ultimate step towards a high-end broadband network with a connection 
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speed of up to 1 Gbit/s73.  As mentioned above, investment in FTTH was not 
very distinct so far in Austria.74
Thus,  before  I  will  talk  about  economic  and regulatory  consequences  of 
investment into new infrastructure in the broadband sector, I will have a 
look on what plans for constructing new infrastructure Telekom Austria has 
in the upcoming years.
First of all,  they want to realise projects with FTTH and FTTB, FTTC by 
using VDSL in four areas: Villach, Klagenfurt and two districts of Vienna 
(15th and 19th). Moreover, they plan to implement VDSL in most of the main 
distribution  frames  till  2012,  which  ensures  much  higher  bandwidth75, 
mainly at MDFs where the local loop is not yet unbundled. However, plans 
for a nationwide or at least region-wide deployment of FTTH do not seem 
to exist.
7.3 Why Telekom Austria's market power is problematic  
“Telekom Austria has – in an economic sense - a high and durable market 
power  on  the  market  in  question”,  assesses  the  RTR  in  M  3/09-7376. 
Therefore, already now and without further deployment of NGA, there are 
73 As it is the case for example in Japan (Single Star), see 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/FTTH#Situation_in_Japan (visited on June, 5th, 2010)
74 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 14
75 According to Telekom Austria, the VDSL technology can ensure a data rate of 20-
30Mbit/s within a radius of 800 metres and 10-12 Mbit/s within a radius of 1600 metres 
(Source: RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 20)
76 RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 20; (transl.)
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problems for competition in the wholesale market, which should be solved 
by regulation. 
One problem would be that TA has no interest in voluntarily unbundling 
their networks, because they would fear alternative network operators and 
thus more competition and lower profit. Through “excessive pricing”, TA 
could put competitors out of business, in the case that TA was not allowed 
to not unbundle their  services.  By charging too high prices,  it  would be 
unprofitable  for  the  competitors  to  offer  their  products  in  that  case. 
Furthermore, TA could counteract competition by non-tariff measures, e.g. 
lower quality.77 
The implementation of NGNs can evoke further problems for competition. 
If a line  from a main distribution frame to a serving area interface or from a 
serving  area  interface  to  a  single  household  consisting  of  twisted  pair 
copper wires is already unbundled, a deployment of FTTC, FTTB or FTTH 
can  result  in  unserviceableness  of  the  connection  by  competitors,  if  the 
technical  preconditions  are  not  given  any  more.  And  even,  if  the 
competitors still  can use their infrastructure, they will not be competitive 
and at some point drop out of the retail market, since they face a longer 
distance  using  VDSL  from  the  main  distribution  frame  to  the  single 
household  than  the  market  leader  using  VDSL  from  the  serving  area 
interface to the household and thus the alternative operators have to offer a 
lower bandwidth. 
77 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 20/21
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Similarly, it might be impossible for the competitors to use the collocation at 
the  main  distribution  frame  to  unbundle  new  local  loops,  so  that  it  is 
unusable for the competitors to reach new customers. The collocation then 
would  have  to  be  built  at  the  serving  area  interface,  which  brings  up 
another problem for the competitors. 
Due to high fixed costs for the collocation, there must be a critical amount of 
potential  customers for the competitor to be profitable to  serve a certain 
attraction area, which is certainly much lower at a serving area interface 
than at a main distribution frame78. Furthermore, a collocation needs some 
space  and  other  standards  (e.g.  electricity  supply),  which  might  not  be 
available at a serving area interface. 
7.4 Deployment of NGNs by TA and competitiors  
Concerning the deployment of NGNs, TA and alternative network operators 
have  specific  advantages,  whereas,  clearly,  without  any  regulation  they 
would be much higher for TA as for the market leader.
As the monopolist, TA can access their already existing network and use 
spare ducts, which saves the high costs for rewiring. Another advantage is 
the status of TA as the “Austrian” supplier of telecommunications services, 
78 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 15: At an SAI there are at maximum 500 who can be served; 
at an MDF the unbundled attraction area is 6.097 on average;  if an access point does not 
cover 1000 potential users or more, a collocation is usually not profitable.
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which helps them in negotiations, especially with public entities. Moreover, 
with their high number of fixed subscribers, it is much easier for the TA to 
reach enough customers to implement a technical enhancement profitably. 
On the  other  hand,  cable  operators,  for  instance,  have the  advantage  of 
already existing high bandwidths within their networks (up to 100 Mbit/s),  
whereas they can only serve certain (typically urban) areas. Mobile network 
operators, which faced a high growth on the mobile internet sector in recent 
years in Austria (as shown above), still did not reach the maximum of their 
bandwidth. New technologies as Long Term Evolution (LTE) guarantee a 
bandwidth of about 100Mbit/s in the future. Anyway, this development is 
still some years ahead and might be expensive in the beginning. Also other 
utilities as electricity grid operators or municipal utilities have already laid 
tracks for fibre glass networks, which might be used in the future.
Despite  these  advantages  for  alternative  network  operators,  the  RTR 
assesses, that the benefits for Telekom Austria are too essential for any other 
operator  to build up a NGN with similar dimensions79.
7.5 Regulatory remedies  
In order to limit the possible negative consequences of Telekom Austria's 
high  market  power  on  competition,  the  RTR  brought  up  regulatory 
remedies, which should ensure higher competition in the future, especially 
79 cf. RTR (2010) M3/09-73, p. 19
61
concerning deployment of NGN/NGA. I will focus on those, which affect 
competition most. 
7.5.1 Traditional unbundling  
First of all, RTR imposed access to unbundled network components on TA, 
which should avoid, that the assessed market power on the wholesale level 
is  transferred to  other  (i.e.  retail)  markets.  Therefore,  TA has  to  provide 
shared use (of local loops) or unbundling of local loops. Moreover,  there 
must  not  be  spatial  constraints  of  the  collocation  rooms  at  the  main 
distribution frames, if the space is needed for deployment of NGN/NGA. 
Also at  the service area  interfaces  the possibility  for  alternative network 
operators to extend their infrastructure up to that point has to be created 
(i.e.  there  must  be  a  possibility  to  have  a  collocation  at  serving  area 
interfaces). Of course, this will be only appropriate, if it is profitable for the 
alternative network operator to serve enough customers from the serving 
area interface (we assessed before, that this is hardly ever the case due to 
low numbers of possible customers).80 
7.5.2 Provision of (unused) infrastructure  
In order to ensure the possibility for alternative network operators to build 
their  own infrastructure,  the RTR imposed a remedy on TA to offer free 
cable ducts to their competitors (especially from the main distribution frame 
80 cf. RTR (2010) M3 09-73, p. 22/23
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to service area interfaces and from competitors' points of presence to main 
distribution  frames/service  area  interfaces).  This  is  important,  because 
trenching  would  probably  be  to  expensive  for  alternative  network 
operators.  New  infrastructure  is  important  from  a  competition  point  of 
view, because it makes them independent from the monopolist. A problem 
is that up to now, only ten percent of the cables use a duct. 
Moreover,  the  RTR assesses,  that  the  admission  to  “dark  fibre”  (optical 
fibres, that are currently not in use) has to be provided by TA.81 
7.5.3 Virtual unbundling  
When TA enlarges their  fibre optic  network closer to the customers (e.g. 
from  main  distribution  frames  to  serving  area  interfaces),  as  argued, 
alternative network operators face such a small number of customers for 
each collocation,  that  is  not  profitable  any more to  serve the customers. 
Therefore traditional unbundling is not useful any more. 
Thus, new measures have to be created in order to maintain competition. 
So, the RTR developed the concept of “Virtual unbundling” for areas, where 
TA plans to deploy NGNs.
In order to implement virtual unbundling, TA has to offer a new wholesale 
product.  It  can be  seen  as  a  compromise  between Bit-stream access  and 
traditional  unbundling,  whereas  it  is  much  more  flexible  that  those 
methods. It is independent of the used technology and should account for 
81 cf. RTR (2010) M3 09-73, p. 24
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individual and independent service design. Hereafter, virtual unbundling is 
designed to  replace  the  variety  of  different  wholesale  services  that  exist 
right  now  and  end  up  in  one  wholesale  service,  which  can  be  flexibly 
adjusted to the users' needs. One main problem, which should be faced by 
virtual  unbundling is the fact,  that by deploying FTTC/FTTB, it  becomes 
unprofitable for competitors to have collocations at the service area interface 
instead of previously used ones at the main distribution frame. By using 
virtual unbundling, the collocation could remain at the main distribution 
frame or  even at  any higher network layer,  even though,  the fibre optic 
wires are deployed further82. 
7.5.4 Non-discrimination  
The RTR imposed the remedy on the TA to make a standard offer in order to 
ensure  that  the  TA itself,  associated  undertakings  or  competitors  which 
demand the same services are treated equally with respect to prices and 
quality of the correspondent services. To ensure this equal treatment,  TA 
must transparently offer the necessary data to competitors.
7.5.5 Tariff-control  
Since TA has incentives to use excessive pricing to force competitors out of 
the market, the RTR assessed, that price caps for their wholesale products 
are necessary in order to prevent uncompetitive behaviour. The regulated 
82 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 2; pp. 25-27
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price must be the minimum of cost-oriented price cap and margin squeeze – 
free price. (p. 31) 
Whether a price is free of margin squeeze, can be assessed by looking at the 
retail prices of the incumbent TA. Therefore the RTR proposed to use APRU 
(Average  Revenue  Per  User)  for  all  services  offered  together.  Of  course, 
activities that would have to be provided and paid by the competitors (e.g. 
technical  achievements,  costs  for  infrastructure;  marketing,  accounting, 
amenities, …) must not be included, since the aim is to assess the benefit of 
exactly the service, which is sold by the incumbent to the competitor.
Finally, the estimated revenue has to be compared to the costs TA would 
have  to  pay  if  it  were  an  alternative  provider  (i.e.  costs  for  wholesale 
services,  collocation,  back-haul  connection  etc.).  If  the  result  is  positive, 
there is no margin squeeze. 
Moreover, for single products or services it has to be checked, if predatory 
pricing prevails (i.e. if the revenues meet variable costs).
7.5.6 A reaction of TA to the imposed remedies  
In a response to the paper of the RTR, TA argued, that through cable and 
mobile internet,  infrastructure-based competition has established83,  which 
should be a reason for deregulating measures. 
In  my opinion,  this  argument  is  not  negligible.  Especially  in  the mobile 
83 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 36
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internet sector, it can be possible to cover most households in Austria with 
high-speed internet.  Already nowadays,  the operator with the – by their 
own  account  –  largest  UMTS-network,  “3”,  could  serve  94%  of  the 
households  in  Austria  with  UMTS84.  Clearly,  with  7,2  Mbit/s85 (using 
HSDPA), UMTS is just comparable with ADSL and definitely not with new 
generation networks, but there is fast development in this sector as well. 
Using HSDPA+, “3” argues, theoretical bandwidths of 28Mbit/s are possible 
today86. 
And the future brings even more technically advanced offers. By using the 
follow-up standard, LTE (Long Term Evolution), downstream speed up to 
100 Mbit/s and upstream speed up to 50 Mbit/s87 are theoretically possible, 
which is at least comparable to cable and fibreglass networks.  Anyway, this 
development  will  most  likely  take  several  years  to  be  available  and 
affordable for customers.
When looking at the cable network as another rival network, the biggest 
problem  is,  that  cable  network  operators  can  only  serve  areas  of  large 
population density  today.  It  might  be  the  case,  that  in  large  cities  cable 
access is an alternative to TA's network, but it is certainly not in rural areas, 
whereby this can be hardly seen as reason for not regulating TA. 
84 http://derstandard.at/1245820138420/3-Wir-haben-die-groesste-UMTS-Netzabdeckung   
(visited on June, 5th, 2010)
85 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UMTS  , (visited on May, 29th, 2010)
86 http://derstandard.at/1245820138420/3-Wir-haben-die-groesste-UMTS-Netzabdeckung   
(visited on June, 5th, 2010)
87 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3GPP_Long_Term_Evolution  , (visited on May, 29th, 2010)
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7.6 A closer look at the RTR policy  
Taking the proposed regulatory measures and the economic surroundings, 
in this chapter I will try to analyse what might be problematic about the 
imposed remedies.
A criticism of the paper of the RTR certainly is, that they hardly mention, 
how  to  treat  FTTH-cases,  which  would  certainly  be  the  most  powerful 
future broadband technology. As we have seen in Fig. 5, in other countries 
as  Japan or  South  Korea,  FTTH is  already  widely  spread88,  which  gives 
those countries a clear competitive edge compared to European countries. 
In Austria,  as argued, there is only one case (Villach),  where TA already 
started  a  test  run,  whereas  we  do  not  know,  how much  FTTH is  used 
compared to FTTC and FTTB in  this  and in the coming up test  runs  in 
Klagenfurt and Vienna. 
Certainly,  Telekom Austria has reasons for not investing too fast  in new 
generation networks. For instance, new generation networks enable a wide 
range of new services, which could compete with TA's own products. 
Take  VoIP,  for  example:  As  NGNs  enhance,  VoIP  will  become  more 
important than it is nowadays. Since using VoIP, provided by an ISP for an 
already existing broadband access is much cheaper than additionally using 
the  conventional  telephone  network,  customers  will  switch  to  the  new 
technology.  The  monopolist,  Telekom  Austria  will  not  only  lose  their 
88 cf. Jaag (2009), p. 45
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customers  of  their  conventional  telephone  network  to  their  own  VoIP-
services, but also to alternative network operators, which offer high-speed 
internet  with  VoIP  rather  than  they  did  offer  a  conventional  telephone 
access.  Here the mentioned replacement effect  would occur,  which gives 
incentives to TA not to invest into new generation networks. 
One solution for this problem would be to make it  easier for alternative 
network operators to invest into own infrastructure. An initiation is made 
by the obligation imposed by RTR on TA to open up their spare ducts and 
dark fibre for alternative network operators. 
Another remedy is the possibility for alternative network operators to invest 
into VDSL at the main distribution frame, which would have to be tolerated 
by TA in any case and without any limit to foster NGN/NGA89. A problem 
hereby is,  that  the follow-up technologies,  FTTC/B/H, are more powerful 
and thus, investment into VDSL at  the main distribution frame could be 
useless  before  the  alternative  service  operators  could  amortise  the 
investment. 
Hence,  RTR developed a  system,  in  which  TA has  to  bear  a  part  of  the 
investment risk by the alternative network operators. If TA builds up FTTC 
(FTTB/FTTH)  at  a  certain  main  distribution  frame,  where  an  alternative 
network operator invested into VDSL within a certain time period, TA has 
to  pay  a  certain  share  of  the  investment  cost  to  the  alternative  network 
89 RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 48
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operator.90
This step might be a good way to foster investment into VDSL, but in my 
opinion it is not a good way to boost the optic fibre technologies. 
First, if TA wants to invest into FTTC at a main distribution frame, where an 
alternative network operator already runs VDSL, TA has not only to bear 
the investment of FTTC including the risk, but they have also to pay for the 
amortisation of the investment into VDSL by alternative network operators. 
Since  in  RTR's  proposal,  the  time  frame  for  a  total  amortisation  of  an 
investment  into  VDSL  at  a  main  distribution  frame  is  three  years91, 
investment  into optic  fibre networks could be postponed by exactly that 
time. 
At least, to ensure that inefficient investment incentives are as improbable 
as possible, RTR took into account the general risk of investment into new 
technologies into their considerations. 92
Furthermore, the general rule counts, that technologies, that already exist, 
have  a  priority  before  technologies  that  are  to  be  done,  if  the  two 
technologies could disturb each others from a technical point of view. That 
means, that TA has to consider, if an alternative network operators might 
want to  continue their  VDSL-services even,  if  TA invests  into optic  fibre 
technology and has  to  take into  account  possible  technical  interferences, 
which would give VDSL an advantage rather than FTTx. 
90 RTR (2010), M3/09-73, pp. 48/49
91 cf. RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 49
92 RTR (2010), M3/09-73, p. 49
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Second,  this  rule  would  also  counteract  investment  incentives  into 
FTTC/B/H for alternative network operators for a similar reason. If they just 
invested  into  VDSL  at  a  main  distribution  frame,  alternative  network 
operators will wait to amortise their investment, before they even think of 
investing into other infrastructure. 
To account for these problems,  RTR extended their  proposed package of 
measures.  TA now has the opportunity to announce, where they definitely 
do  not  want  to  deploy  FTTx  within  a  certain  time  frame.  This  should 
facilitate  investment  decisions  by  alternative  network  operators.  On  the 
other hand, for areas, which are not part of this announcement, TA is given 
the chance to  change VDSL to FTTx and offer corresponding wholesale 
products,  whereas  it  must  be  ensured,  that  the  alternative  network 
operators have the possibility to offer their new services at the same time 
when TA does.  Still,  VDSL-investments  that  were  undertaken before  the 
announcement of TA can only be changed into FTTx, if alternative network 
operators and TA cooperate. 
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8 Possible strategies for a faster deployment of   
NGNs
As illustrated, concerning the deployment of fibre optic networks, Austria is 
one of  the most  unprogressive countries  even in  the,  compared to other 
industrialized countries as in Asia, backward European Union. To ensure 
competitiveness,  there  must  be  large  investments  into  that  field  in  the 
upcoming years.  Remember,  that  the  OECD predicted,  that  one third of 
productivity  growth  will  come  from broadband  services  in  the  future.93 
Therefore, policies have to be found, which foster broadband deployment 
more  than  it  happened  within  the  last  years.  I  will  discuss  several 
approaches  of how the huge investments into new infrastructure could be 
taken. 
First  of  all,  regulatory  incentives  as  the  mentioned  regulatory  holidays, 
which could ensure, that telecommunication firms establish NGN/NGA on 
their  own are  one  way  to  foster  investment  into  modern  infrastructure. 
Since this  will  most likely not be enough to serve especially rural  areas, 
other solutions have to be found. These range from public control of the 
deployment of NGNs to co-operations between firms and public entities, as 
we will see in this chapter.
93 Heng (2010), in “Broadband infrastructure”, Deutsche Bank Research, p.3
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8.1 Regulatory holidays  
In order to ensure planning reliability for the undertakings – either TA or 
alternative network operators -, a framework for the deployment of high-
speed  networks  would  be  necessary,  which  offers  investors  special 
incentives and certainty about their investments. Some of RTR's proposals 
point in the right direction, but there might be other ways of how to foster 
deployment of infrastructure by regulation policy.
As argued in Chapter 5, regulatory holidays for a certain time could be a 
way to ensure planning reliability. Anyway, as mentioned, in RTR's proposal 
they are not an issue at all. Deployment of FTTx-networks by TA allows for 
alternative  network  operators  to  use  it  at  the  same  time  as  TA does. 
Therefore,  at least in regions, where TA already faces harsh competition, 
there are hardly any incentives for them to bear the investment risk into 
FTTx. In regions, where TA is still  dominant,  maybe because investment 
costs by alternative operators are too high for entry into the market, TA has 
at  least  some  incentive to  invest  into modern infrastructure,  as  they can 
attract the whole market in the future as well.
Another  proposal  is,  that  whatever  undertaking  is  first  at  connecting  a 
building or household to the fibre glass network, has exclusive rights for a 
certain time frame to serve the household or building. This policy would 
ensure, that there are no parallel networks built and from a regulatory point 
of view, it creates the same preconditions for every market player. However, 
other factors, like the easiness for the companies to get the necessary capital 
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to be able to connect the households to their networks are different for each 
firm. It is certainly easier and cheaper for a state-owned incumbent to get 
enough capital to make the investments than it is for a small competitor. 
Furthermore,  competition  on  the  service  level  is  disturbed  for  the  time 
frame, where one firm has the exclusive right to serve a household94.
8.2 Open Access  
Many electric  utilities  recently built  up so-called “passive” infrastructure 
and focussed on the operation of the networks, but disposed their networks 
to  service  providers  instead  of  competing  in  downstream  markets  by 
themselves.  This  is  the  concept  of  Open  Access.  Therefore,  network 
infrastructure can be used by several undertakings at the same time, which 
creates a competitive environment. They have access to bottlenecks without 
being discriminated against, which means, that every service provider faces 
the  same costs  and quality  and thus  competition in  the  retail  market  is 
enforced, which would lead to lower prices, because service providers then 
have to focus on the efficiency of their own firm.
The most important  precondition is,  that  the owners or operators of  the 
infrastructure,  who  sell  their  services  to  service  providers,  are  not 
participating  in  downstream  markets.  Since,  often,  vertically  integrated 
telecommunication  companies  are  owners  of  infrastructure,  they  could 
abuse their status and not offer access to their networks to other operators 
or offer them under worse conditions. This would call for regulation, as we 
94 cf. Jaag et al. (2009), p.51; RTR (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, p. 104
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have seen in the last chapter, where a remedy was imposed on TA to allow 
competitors to use dark fibre, for instance. Contrary, Open Access means, 
that  even,  if  an  incumbent  provides  infrastructure,  she  must  not  be 
participating in the retail market.95
But also, if the network operator is not vertically integrated and thus not 
active on the retail market, it might be, that her network forms a monopoly 
again. Then, regulation for the wholesale market might be necessary as well 
in order to ensure, that competitive prices are enforced.
In South Korea, the country with the internationally highest penetration rate 
of  NGN/NGA,  for  instance,  open  access  is  the  basic  principle  of 
telecommunications policies.  Every network operator  has to  grant  others 
access  to  their  networks.  This  is  not  only  true  for  monopolists  or 
incumbents, but also for new market participants. The aim of Korea's policy 
primarily was, to foster competition not only on the service but also on the 
infrastructure level. In fact, nowadays, customers can not only choose their 
service provider, but also, which technology they want to use96. The only 
exception are fibre glass networks, which are built after 200497.
Politically,  open access  could be  enforced by implementing duct  sharing 
obligations, for instance. At the same time, it has to be ensured, that firms 
do not engage in wholesale and retail markets at the same time and thus, 
they might have to be broken apart.
95 cf. RTR (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, p. 67
96 cf. Jaag et al. (2009), p.25
97 cf. Jaag et al. (2009), p. 51
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8.3 Public control of network deployment  
Since in many cases, single firms are not able to manage the deployment of 
broadband infrastructure efficiently,  public  authorities  could intervene in 
the process of network deployment actively, and not only by a regulatory 
framework.
One way of intervention could be, that the state still owns the incumbent 
and as the holder can force the company to investment into infrastructure to 
gain the politically decided aims for broadband deployment. One problem 
hereby is, that the intervention of the state distorts the market significantly, 
and thus, it has to be ensured, that the incumbent does not have any long-
term advantage through this policy compared to the competitors.
To not disturb downstream markets, one possibility is to spin the part of the 
firm, which is responsible for infrastructure deployment, off the incumbent. 
Thus, a new firm is created, which still is publicly owned and could reach 
the policy aims by specializing on laying tracks. The new firm then should 
provide its facilities to service providers in a non-discriminatory way. This 
goes hand in hand with open access  policy.  Similarly,  a  completely new 
state-company  could  be  founded  to  bear  the  investments  into  modern 
broadband infrastructure.
In both cases, the operation of the publicly built networks could be operated 
by separate (and regulated) firms.
75
In Austria, TA and other public utilities as Wien Energie98, for instance, want 
to  start  or  already  started  the  deployment  of  FTTH.  Since  it  is  not  one 
company  which  is  responsible  for  the  deployment,  there  might  be 
cooperation problems, which might in the worst case lead to parallel and 
thus inefficiently built infrastructure.
Thus, another facet is to leave the actual deployment of infrastructure in 
private hand and only route the investments into a direction favoured by 
the state.  This can be reached by putting an infrastructure project out to 
tender,  for  instance.  In  this  case,  the  distortion  of  the  economy  is 
significantly  less  than  in  the  cases  above,  because  the  bidding  process 
ensures that the company with the lowest costs gets the order to build up 
the  infrastructure.  An  alternative  is  to  direct  the  deployment  of 
infrastructure by granting or not granting easement rights.
A way,  by  which  little  distortion  has  to  be  bewailed  as  well,  is,  when 
companies get subsidies or cheap credits for their infrastructure deployment 
in a non-discriminatory way. However, the problem may arise, that in this 
case,  too  much  (e.g.  parallel)  infrastructure  is  built,  which  leads  to 
inefficient results.
To foster investment not only in urban but also rural areas, a grant in urban 
areas to  deploy NGN (where it  is  highly profitable)  can be linked to an 
obligation for deployment of a certain extent in rural areas as well.
98 cf. http://www.blizznet.at (visited on June 12th, 2010)
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8.4 Cooperation and PPP  
Since the expenditures that have to be taken when investing into broadband 
infrastructure, the difficulty to get the necessary amount of money by own 
or lent capital and the corresponding high risk for getting revenues soon to 
pay  back  the  credits  or  satisfy  investors  with  high  returns  are  almost 
unbearable for single firms, there have to be forms of cooperation, which 
divide the costs and risks between several participants.
This need not necessarily be the state and private firms. Also incumbent and 
competitors could cooperate, if an investment is too costly for both single 
firms. This can include the actual deployment or running and maintaining 
the infrastructure. Of course, any co-operation between two separate firms 
can evoke another problem for competition: cartels. Therefore, it must be 
ensured, that the co-operation is transparent and limited to some extent. 
Furthermore,  there  must  not  be  any  exclusion  of  other  competitors. 
According  to  RTR,  the  European  Commission  has  a  “positive  attitude” 
towards co-operations for deploying broadband networks99.
Municipals could provide subsidies for broadband investment in order to 
raise their own competitiveness. Another factor, which is a main matter of 
expense for FTTH, the wiring within a building, could be minimized by co-
operation between a network operator and building societies.
99  RTR (2009) “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, p. 126
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Anyway,  a  broadly  seen  “magic  bullet”100 for  financing  investment  into 
telecommunications  infrastructure  are  public  private  partnerships  (PPP). 
PPP  is  a  cooperation  between  public  utilities  and  private  firms  for 
“financing,  construction,  renovation,  operation  or  maintenance”  of 
infrastructure101.
Fig.  7:  While  in  the  traditional  process  of  financing  a  project,  the  lender  is  
dependent on the financial  situation of  the company, which enforces the project,  
PPP ensures, that the lender “only” depends on the profitability of the project, she  
is involved in. The awarding authority (usually a public entity) orders the project  
and most likely provides some initial capital.
100 RTR (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich” , p. 105
101  Seiringer “Chancen und Voraussetzungen von PPP beim Ausbau von 
Telekommunikationsinfrastrukturen”, Presentation, 26. Mai 2009 (translation). 
(http://www.rtr.at/de/komp/Vortraege26052009/Seiringer.pdf visited on June 17th, 2010)
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The concept  of  project-financing via  PPP induces  the  profitability  of  the 
project.  As  we  have  learnt,  this  need  not  be  the  case  for  broadband 
infrastructure, especially in rural areas. There are a lot of uncertainties, for 
example  resulting  of  unknown future  demand,  competing  infrastructure 
(mobile internet) or future regulation policies (could the infrastructure cost 
be recouped due to a short time monopoly?), which make it seem unlikely 
to use PPP as the main strategy for fostering broadband deployment102.
8.5 Public subsidies  
After years of liberalizing the telecommunications market there seems to be 
a  change  in  policies  ahead.  Most  probably  it  is  not  possible  to  build 
comprehensive  new  generation  networks  without  any  help  of  public 
authorities, especially in rural areas.
As  argued,  PPPs  might  not  be  the  ideal  tool  in  the  case  of  broadband 
deployment.  Public  control  of  broadband  deployment  might  head  the 
investments into the right direction, but still, more intervention by the state 
or other public authorities seems to be unavoidable for the  public aims of 
broadband network deployment to be fulfilled.
Now, there are several ways, how the state could reach faster deployment of 
broadband infrastructure. One way would be to grant a tax relief for certain 
services or subsidies for services, which use new technologies. The resulting 
higher demand for such services, which need high-speed internet, generates 
102 cf. RTR, (2009),  “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”  pp. 105-107; Seiringer (2009)
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higher demand for broadband access and thus makes it less risky for a firm 
to  invest  into  the  corresponding  infrastructure,  because  then  there  are 
enough customers to  serve profitably. Similarly,  the development of  new 
services could be subsidized. These method were used in Austria already in 
some cases.  In  2003,  for  instance,  a  tax  relief  for  broadband access  was 
enforced and e-government facilities were implemented103. 
Another  way  is  to  directly  subsidize  network  operators  for  deploying 
broadband infrastructure. In this case, the question arises of how to control, 
if such a subsidy is really used for network deployment. Another problem 
is,  that it  is  hard to measure,  if  these subsidies are granted without any 
discrimination of  competitors.  For  example,  in Austria,  most competitors 
are against  public  subsidies  for  broadband infrastructure,   because from 
their point of view, most subsidies were granted to the incumbent Telekom 
Austria104.
Of course, state subsidies are generally prohibited by EU law (Art. 87), if 
they would or could disturb competition or trade between member states in 
any way.  For the  special  case of  broadband deployment,  there  are rules 
published by the European Commission to grant subsidies under certain 
circumstances105.
103 RTR (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, p. 47
104 RTR, (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, p. 124 
105 cf. Discussion in RTR (2009), “Breitbandanschlussnetze in Österreich”, pp. 127-129
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9 Conclusion and outlook  
In the first part of this work I analysed the current regulation strategies in 
the European Union and presented a regulation model, which should allow 
for  an  investment-friendly  environment  by  granting  long  regulatory 
holidays.  The  authors  who  proposed  this  model  argued,  that  it  would 
perfectly  fit  for  telecommunications  markets  since  it  accounted  for 
infrastructure-based competition. However, I criticised, that this could lead 
to parallel and thus inefficient infrastructure deployment. Furthermore, the 
maximum period of twelve years with the first four years of no control for 
regulation  at  all,  seem  to  be  a  quite  long  time,  in  which  long-lasting 
monopolies could be established.
The  second part  of  the  work  dealt  with  the  case  of  Austria.  Here,  next 
generation  networks  did  not  reach  a  state  of  very  far  expansion  so  far. 
However, in order to remain the economic attractiveness internationally, it is 
necessary  for  the  country  to  kick-.start  more  investment  into  modern 
broadband infrastructure, especially regarding fibre optic technology. 
Therefore,  I  analysed  proposed  regulatory  remedies  of  the  Austrian 
regulation  authority  for  telecommunications  markets,  RTR.  Moreover,  I 
assessed,  that  only regulatory measures might not be enough to reach a 
sufficient  state  of  broadband  network  deployment,  which  led  me  into 
brining  up  other  policy  options  to  foster  investment  into  broadband 
infrastructure.
The main policy implications were:
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– ensure an investment-friendly regulatory environment, which first of 
all provides certainty for affected undertakings
– enforce  Open Access  –  policy  in  order  to  ensure  efficient  service-
based competition
– direct  and  financially  help  investments  into  broadband 
infrastructure,  especially  in  areas,  where  a  solely  market-solution 
would not lead to any deployment of NGNs at all
Some of those implications are already in effect.  There are initiatives for 
subsidizing broadband infrastructure. The RTR did a lot of research to find 
optimal regulation strategies. Anyway, there will still be a lot of work to do 
to find ways to give enough incentives for firms to invest even more into 
broadband infrastructure. Regarding the possible welfare effects of a quick 
broadband deployment, every day, in which no investment is done, is a lost 
day for Austria's economy. 
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APPENDIX
GERMAN ABSTRACT
Diese  Diplomarbeit  beschäftigt  sich  mit  neuen  Märkten  im 
Telekommunikationssektor,  fokussiert  auf  Breitbandausbau in  Österreich. 
Zunächst  wird analysiert,  welche Auswirkungen ein rascher Ausbau von 
Breitband mit hohen Bandbreiten auf eine Volkswirtschaft haben kann. In 
weiterer  Folge  werden  theoretische  und  rechtliche  Grundlagen  der 
aktuellen Regulierungspolitik in Europa und Österreich dargestellt. Bevor 
versucht  wird,  eine  Regulierungspolitik  zu  finden,  die  Breitbandausbau 
bestmöglich  fördert,  wird  auf  dynamische  Effizienz  eingegangen,  die  in 
diesem Zusammenhang wichtiger erscheint als das - üblicherweise in der 
Wettbewerbspolitik - “Maß aller Dinge” - statische Effizienz.
Da  festgestellt  wird,  dass  Österreich  in  Sachen  Breitbandausbau  (“Next 
Generation  Networks”)  deutlich  hinter  den  führenden  Nationen  wie 
Singapur  zurückliegt,  soll  analysiert  werden  wo  die  Gründe  für  diesen 
Rückstand  liegen  und  wie  sie  behoben  werden  können.  Dabei  wird 
festgestellt,  dass  viele  Einzelmaßnahmen  zu  deutlichen  Verbesserungen 
führen  können,  wobei  manche  davon  bereits  umgesetzt  werden.  “Open 
Access”, “Regulierungsferien” oder öffentliche Förderungen könnten Wege 
liefern, um Österreichs Breitbandausbau zu forcieren um in dem Land nicht 
nachhaltig einen Wettbewerbsnachteil zu verursachen.
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